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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 09-2296
                    
 ASCH WEBHOSTING, INC.,
d/b/a 1104net.com,
                                          Appellant
v.
ADELPHIA BUSINESS SOLUTIONS INVESTMENT, LLC,
d/b/a Telcove
                    
On Appeal From the United States 
District Court
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-04-cv-02593)
District Judge:  Hon. Mary L. Cooper
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 15, 2010
BEFORE:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: January 25, 2010)
                    
2                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Asch Webhosting, Inc. (“Asch”), filed this civil action against Adelphia
Business Solutions Investment LLC, doing business as Telcove (“Telcove”), alleging
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional
interference with contractual relations.   Asch appeals the order of the District Court
granting summary judgment in favor of Telcove.
Because we write only for the benefit of the parties, we assume familiarity with the
facts of this civil action and the proceedings in the District Court.  We will affirm
essentially for the reasons stated by the District Court.  
I.  
Telcove is an internet service provider (“ISP”), which purchases capacity from
“upstream” providers of internet services and sells that capacity to smaller ISPs
“downstream,” like Asch.  Telcove and Asch entered into a three-year agreement
(“Agreement”) under which Telcove agreed to provide internet services to Asch.  Shortly
after activating Asch’s internet service in February 2004, Telcove began receiving
complaints about emails sent from internet protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with
Asch.  Telcove eventually received nearly fifteen hundred complaints about emails sent
3from these IP addresses.  In addition, one of Telcove’s upstream providers notified
Telcove that it risked losing its internet service because of the content of an email sent
from an IP address associated with Asch.  On April 28, 2004, Telcove informed Asch by
letter that it was terminating its internet service on April 30, 2004.  The letter notified
Asch that the Agreement was being terminated in accordance with sections (b) and (g) of
the Acceptable Use Policy set forth in the Agreement.  However, after a discussion
between counsel, Telcove agreed to continue providing internet service to Asch so that it
would have time to procure internet services from another provider.  On June 10, 2004,
Telcove stopped providing internet service to Asch.   
Asch did not reach agreement with another internet provider and ceased
operations.  Asch then initiated this civil action against Telcove.  Telcove moved for
summary judgment on these claims, arguing that an exculpatory clause in the Agreement
prevented Asch from recovering the damages it sought.  The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Telcove and subsequently denied Asch’s motion for
reconsideration.  Asch filed a timely appeal.  
II. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Telcove, concluding that
Asch’s claim for damages was precluded by the exculpatory clause included in the
Agreement between the parties and that the exculpatory clause was enforceable.  Under
New Jersey law, exculpatory clauses in private contracts are “generally sustained so long
      The parties agree that New Jersey law applies to the Agreement.  1
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as they do not adversely affect the public interest.”  Chem. Bank of N. J. Nat’l Ass’n v.
Bailey, 687 A.2d 316, 322 (N.J. Super. 1997).   They are ordinarily upheld in the1
commercial context because “[t]he judiciary will not undertake the writing of a different
or better contract between the parties.”  See id.  (quoting Swisscraft Novelty Co. v. Alad
Realty Corp., 274 A.2d 59, 62 (N.J. Super. 1971)).  Thus, an exculpatory clause will be
enforced if “1) it does not adversely affect the public interest; 2) the exculpated party is
not under a legal duty to perform; 3) it does not involve a public utility or common
carrier; or 4) the contract does not grow out of unequal bargaining power or is otherwise
unconscionable.”  Gershon v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 845 A.2d 720, 727 (N.J. Super.
2004).  Asch argues that the first and fourth exceptions apply to the exculpatory clause at
issue here.              
The exculpatory clause at issue states as follows: 
Warranties/Disclaimers 
TELCOVE’S INTERNET SERVICE IS PROVIDED ON
AN “AS IS, AS AVAILABLE” BASIS UNLESS STATED
OTHERWISE IN THE TELCOVE’S SERVICE LEVEL
AGREEMENT (SLA).  NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE MADE WITH RESPECT
TO TELCOVE’S INTERNET SERVICES(S) OR ANY
IN F O R M A T IO N  O R  S O F T W A R E  T H E R E IN .
CUSTOMER RELEASES TELCOVE FROM ALL
LIABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DIRECT,
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
5DAMAGES DUE TO LOSS OF REVENUES OR LOSS OF
B U SIN E SS,  SU FF E R E D  B Y  C U ST O M E R  IN
CONNECTION WITH THEIR USE OF OR INABILITY
TO USE THE TELCOVE INTERNET SERVICES.
WITHOUT LIMITING THE GENERALITY OF THE
FOREGOING, TELCOVE DISCLAIMS TO THE FULL
EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW ANY
R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  F O R  ( A N D  U N D E R  N O
CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL BE LIABLE FOR) ANY
CONDUCT, CONTENT, GOODS AND SERVICES
AVAILABLE ON OR THROUGH THE INTERNET OR
TELCOVE SERVICES. IN NO EVENT SHALL
TELCOVE’S AGGREGATE LIABILITY EXCEED THE
AMOUNT PAID BY CUSTOMER TO TELCOVE FOR
THE TELCOVE SERVICES.  USE OF ANY
INFORM ATION OBTAINED VIA TELCOVE’S
INTERNET SERVICE IS AT THE CUSTOMER’S OWN
RISK. TELCOVE SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACCURACY OR QUALITY
OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH ITS
SERVICES.  
[PA 56]  (emphasis in original).   
In this litigation, Asch argued that Telcove’s termination of the Agreement
destroyed its business.  Accordingly, as damages, it sought the fair market value of its
business, allegedly $1.43 million, in consequential damages.  If the exculpatory clause is
enforceable, by its terms it relieves Telcove of any liability for the damages Asch seeks
because Asch agreed to release Telcove from “all liability or responsibility for any direct,
indirect, incidental or consequential damages . . . . suffered by [Asch] in connection with
[its] use of or inability to use the Telcove internet services.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus,
the District Court correctly concluded that the exculpatory clause, if enforceable, barred
      Asch does not dispute the District Court’s interpretation of the exculpatory clause,2
arguing only that the clause was unenforceable.  
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Asch from recovering the damages it sought in this action.   2
The District Court also determined that the exculpatory clause was enforceable
under New Jersey law because enforcement of the clause was neither adverse to the
public interest nor unconscionable.  We agree with both of these conclusions.
On appeal, Asch argues that the District Court erred by concluding that enforcing
the clause would not adversely affect the public interest.  Asch contends that a willful and
predatory breach of contract would be contrary to the public interest.  Cf. Lucier v.
Williams, 841 A.2d 907, 913–16 (N.J. Super. 2004) (holding that a limitation of liability
clause in a home inspection contract essentially operated as an exculpatory clause and
could not be enforced because it contravened New Jersey public policy).  Assuming that
enforcing an exculpatory clause in the case of such a breach would affect the public
interest, Asch has not established that Telcove’s actions were “predatory.”  Telcove
produced evidence demonstrating that it had received numerous complaints about activity
related to Asch’s IP addresses and decided to terminate Asch’s internet service on that
basis.  Importantly, Asch has not presented evidence suggesting that Telcove had a
reason, other than the explanations it gave, for terminating its services to a paying client. 
Although Asch points to a series of emails sent among Telcove employees regarding
Asch’s request for additional IP addresses, these emails do not demonstrate that Telcove
acted predatorily by terminating the Agreement.  Furthermore, assuming that Telcove
7breached the Agreement, enforcing an exculpatory clause after a willful breach of
contract does not necessarily violate public policy.  See Printing Mart-Morristown v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 38 (N.J. 1989) (“Where a person interferes with the
performance of his or her own contract, the liability is governed by principles of contract
law. . . . Contract law serves contractual parties’ economic interest, such as enabling them
efficiently [to] breach the contract, free from the threat of punitive damages.” (internal
citations and quotations omitted)); Saxon Constr. & Mgmt. Corp. v. Masterclean of N.C.,
Inc., 641 A.2d 1056, 1059 (N.J. Super. 1994) (discussing factors to consider when
determining if enforcing a contractual term violates public policy).  Because the public
interest would not be adversely affected by the enforcement of this clause, the District
Court properly enforced it.     
Next, Asch contends that the District Court erred by concluding that the
exculpatory clause in the Agreement was not unconscionable.  “In determining whether a
contract is unconscionable, courts focus on the bargaining power of the parties, the
conspicuousness of the putative unfair term, and the oppressiveness and unreasonableness
of the term.”  Carter v. Exxon Co. USA, 177 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1999).  Here, the
District Court found there was no evidence of unequal bargaining power between the
parties because Asch was a commercial entity that had previously entered into internet
service agreements with several other service providers and was managed by an
experienced businessman who had graduated from law school.  In addition, the Court
8noted that the term was prominently presented in the parties’ agreement and was not
unreasonable or oppressive.
We agree with the District Court’s conclusions about the bargaining power of the
parties and the conspicuousness of the exculpatory clause.  See id.  Moreover, we agree
that the clause is not unconscionable as applied to the facts of this civil action.  See id.
(“It is only when the circumstances of the transaction, including the sellers’ breach, cause
the consequential damage exclusion to be inconsistent with the intent and reasonable
commercial expectations of the parties that invalidation of the exclusionary clause would
be appropriate. . . .” (quoting Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527
A.2d 429, 437–38 (N.J. 1987)).  Here, Telcove provided Asch with notice of its intent to
terminate the Agreement and continued providing internet service to Asch while it
negotiated service agreements with other internet providers.  One provider offered a
monthly fee that was within $200 of Telcove’s monthly fee, but Asch declined that offer
and ceased operations.  Thus, Telcove gave Asch notice and the opportunity to find
another provider before terminating its service to Asch.  Enforcing the exculpatory clause
under these circumstances is not oppressive or unreasonable, and, therefore, the clause is
not unconscionable.        
Finally, Asch claims that the District Court erred by granting the motion for
summary judgment by relying on Telcove’s assertion that it received 1500 complaints
related to Asch’s IP addresses.  Asch argues that the great majority of these complaints
9were anonymous and were not verified by Telcove.  However, the District Court did not
make a finding that the complaints Telcove received were accurate or that Asch was
involved in “spamming” or sending emails with pornographic content.  Instead, the Court
found that Telcove relied on the complaints in good faith and that Asch did not
demonstrate any bad faith of the part of Telcove.  Accordingly, the Court did not err by
considering this evidence when granting summary judgment.  
III.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
